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The present paper shows empirically that the youth dependency ratio (the 
population below working age divided by the population of working age) 
reduces economic growth even after controlling for institutions. The 
institutional variable, the paper controls for, is the measure for institutions that 
is recently preferred in prominent work by Acemoglu and co-authors. 
Institutions turn out to have a significant and positive effect on economic 
growth. The significance of the youth dependency ratio and of institutions 
appears to be robust to controlling for various variables, including malaria 
prevalence. Hence, the paper finds evidence that demography, as well as 
institutions, both matter for economic growth. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
By introducing demography, this paper aims to contribute to a recent 
debate in the empirical growth literature on whether geography has a direct 
effect on economic development (the geography hypothesis) or affects it only 
indirectly through the choice of institutions (the institutions hypothesis). 
Empirical support for the geography hypothesis is found in Sachs (2003) and 
Carstensen and Gundlach (2006). Empirical evidence in favour of the 
institutions hypothesis is found in Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al. 
(2001, 2002), Easterly and Levine (2003) and Rodrik et al. (2004).1 Within the 
literature supporting the institutions hypothesis, the most convincing case has 
been made by Acemoglu et al. (2002). They discovered that, among former 
colonies, those colonies that were among the richest countries in 1500 are 
now among the poorest countries. The authors explain this reversal of fortune 
with the argument that Europeans set up extractive and therefore bad 
institutions in relatively rich colonies that happened to have high settler 
mortality rates. In contrast, they settled in relatively poor colonies that 
happened to have low settler mortality, setting up good institutions in those 
                                                 
1 Both, the literature supporting the geography hypothesis and the literature supporting the 
institutions hypothesis, apply two-stage-least-squares estimation techniques. The literature 
supporting the institutions hypothesis only finds a significant effect of geography in a first-
stage regression of institutions (the instrumented variable) on geographical instrumental 
variables. In contrast, geographical variables do not have a significant effect in a second-
stage regression of income per capita on institutions and geography. Hence, geography has 
only an indirect effect on income per capita through its effect on institutions. The literature 
supporting the geography hypothesis does exactly the same empirical exercise as the 
literature supporting the institutions hypothesis, but uses malaria prevalence as a proxy for 
geography in the second-stage regression. The authors argue that malaria prevalence is a 
better proxy for geography.  Consistent with this view, this literature does find a direct effect of 
geography on economic development.    
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colonies. In turn, according to this work, institutions persisted even after 
independence and had a positive effect on income per capita today. The 
reversal of fortune is very convincing evidence against a direct effect of 
geography on economic development. The reason for this is the fact that, if 
geography had a dominant direct effect on economic development, then the 
relatively rich former colonies should still be rich today, which however is not 
the case.2  
A forerunner of the aforementioned literature supporting the geography 
hypothesis is important work by Bloom and Sachs (1998), then both Harvard 
economists. Using OLS estimation, their paper demonstrates that geography, 
as well as demography, both have direct effects on economic growth. After 
this joint work, the authors separately elaborated their hypothesis in different 
directions. On the one hand, Sachs advanced with co-authors the hypothesis 
that geography has a direct effect on income per capita or economic growth 
(e.g., Gallup et al., 1999, Gallup and Sachs, 2001, and Sachs and Malaney, 
2002). On the other hand, Bloom advanced with co-authors the hypothesis 
that demographic change has a direct effect on economic growth (e.g., Bloom 
and Williamson, 1998, Bloom et al., 2001, and Bloom et al., 2003b). The latter 
literature argues that there is only temporary demographic change during the 
demographic transition (a change from a situation with high mortality and high 
fertility to a situation with low mortality and low fertility). Since in former 
colonies the demographic transition occurred only (if at all) in the second half 
of the 20th century, an important temporary contribution of demographic 
change on economic growth does not imply that former colonies that were rich 
in 1500 have also to be rich today. As a consequence, it is consistent with the 
aforementioned reversal of fortune. Moreover, the aforementioned literature 
on the geography hypothesis versus the institutions hypothesis seems to 
assume that countries are in steady state and therefore has in its regression 
equations the level of income as regressand and no lagged level of income as 
regressor. In contrast, demographic change implies an unstable population 
and therefore economies cannot be in steady state. Therefore, the literature 
by Bloom and co-authors includes in its regression equations the lagged level 
of income as regressor. In addition, it has the rate of economic growth as the 
regressand, following the set-up of Barro (1991).3    
The present paper is most closely related to the work by Bloom and co-
authors on the effect of demographic change on economic growth and a 
literature that developed thereafter. The present paper’s novel contribution is 
to conduct a horse race between demography and institutions as 
determinants of economic growth, similar to the aforementioned literature on 
the geography hypothesis versus the institutions hypothesis. In addition, it 
uses for the institutional variable the measure for institutions that Acemoglu 
and Johnson (2005) prefer, which is Polity IV’s constraint on the executive. 
The work of Acemoglu and co-authors is definitively the most prominent and 
presumably also the most convincing work within the aforementioned 
                                                 
2 For excellent reviews on the reversal of fortune, see Acemoglu (2003) and Hall and Papell 
(2005, pp. 151-158). 
3 As long as the regression equation includes, as regressor, the lagged level of income, both, 
the rate of economic growth and the level of income as regressand, are consistent with 
transitional dynamics, as the latter equation can be derived from the former equation by 
rearranging terms (cf. Caselli et al., 1996). 
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literature supporting the institutions hypothesis. Further, Acemoglu and 
Johnson (2005) is the most recent work of Acemoglu and co-authors of the 
effect of institutions on economic development and therefore reflects their 
most recent view on which measure is the most appropriate measure for 
institutions. An important by-product of this choice of the measure for 
institutions is that the present study is able to apply a measure of the average 
quality of institutions from 1960-2000 to gauge the effect of institutions on 
long-run growth.4 Previous literature on the effect of demography on 
economic growth that controlled for institutions applied for this purpose only 
measures of the quality of institutions in the 1990s as proxies for their average 
quality over a longer time frame. Within its improved framework, the present 
study shows that demography and institutions both matter for economic 
growth. This result survives even after controlling for various variables, 
including malaria prevalence – the proxy for geography mostly preferred by 
Sachs and co-authors.  
The next section reviews in more detail the literature initiated by Bloom 
and co-authors on the effect of demography on economic growth (the 
demographic dividend hypothesis). Section 3 explains the empirical strategy 
of the paper and section 4 presents the basic empirical result of the present 
study. Finally, Section 5 and 6 examine whether the basic result is robust to 
controlling for various variables. 
   
2. THE DEMOGRAPHIC DIVIDEND HYPOTHESIS 
 
As Bloom and Williamson (1998) stress, until the 1980s, there has been a 
debate between population pessimists (e.g., Ehrlich, 1968) and population 
optimists (e.g., Kuznets, 1967, Boserup, 1981 and Simon, 1981). Population 
pessimists believed in a negative effect of population growth on economic 
growth through dilution of resources (the neoclassical growth model is 
consistent with this view). Population optimists believed in a positive effect of 
population growth on economic growth because it would promote technical 
progress (today, growth models with endogenous technical progress are 
consistent with this view, see, e.g., Kremer, 1993). In the 1980s, studies using 
cross-country data did not find a significant effect of population growth on 
economic growth (Bloom and Freeman, 1986, and Kelley, 1988), giving rise to 
a population neutralists view.  
In more recent work, Bloom and Williamson (1998) confirm that there is 
no robust evidence for a significant effect of population growth on economic 
growth. However, they show that population growth has a significant and 
negative effect on economic growth, once one includes in the regression 
equation, as further regressor, growth of the working-age population, where 
the coefficient of growth of the working-age population is significant and 
positive.5 Bloom and Williamson interpret their finding as evidence for a 
                                                 
4 Acemoglu et al. (2001) use instead, as their measure for institutions, average protection 
against expropriation risk from Political Risk Services. However, this variable is only available 
since the 1980s. In addition, it is highly correlated with one of the present paper’s instruments 
for the youth dependency ratio. Therefore, identification with this variable is impossible.   
5 After confirming this result, Kelley and Schmidt (2005) argue that without inclusion of growth 
of the working-age population, its positive growth effect is incorporated into the estimated 
coefficient of population growth and therefore population growth shows up as insignificant.    
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growth effect from changing age structure of the population.6 In the early 
phase of a demographic transition, in which mortality of the population below 
working-age declines strongly and fertility changes slowly, growth of the total 
population exceeds growth of the working-age population. For this reason, in 
the early phase, the demographic transition leads to a demographic burden. 
In a later phase of the demographic transition, in which fertility falls strongly 
and the previously young population with an improved survivor rate ages into 
working-age, growth of the working age population exceeds growth of the total 
population. As a consequence, in this later phase, the demographic transition 
leads to a demographic dividend (see Bloom et al, 2003b). Using their 
qualitative results, Bloom and Williamson (1998) argue that age structure 
changes during the demographic dividend phase contributed to one-third of 
the East-Asian economic growth miracle. 
Bloom et al. (2001) interpret the growth effect from the difference in 
growth of the total population and growth of the working age-population as an 
accounting effect (in contrast, Kelley and Schmidt, 2005, label it translations 
effect). This effect occurs because a changing ratio of the working-age 
population to the total population increases the number of “producers” to the 
number of “consumers” of output. Bloom et al. (2001) improve the insight of 
Bloom and Williamson (1998) by pointing out that there is an additional 
behavioral effect from changing age structure (Kelley and Schmidt, 2005, 
label this effect a productivity effect). In developing countries, a changing ratio 
of the working-age population to the total population arises mainly because of 
a changing youth dependency ratio (the population below working age divided 
by the population of working age). However, a changing youth dependency 
ratio affects savings (recent work that shows empirical support for such an 
effect is, e.g., Kelley and Schmidt, 1996, Higgins and Williamson, 1997, and 
Bloom et al., 2003a). In turn, savings, of course, affect economic growth.   
Using the notation that  is output per capita and  is output per 
working-age person, the accounting effect and the behavioral effect can 
mathematically be decomposed from:  
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where  denotes total population, L denotes the working-age population and 
a “hat” on top of a variable indicates the growth rate. In (1), in the second 
equation,  i.e. growth of output per working-age person, contains the 
behavioral effect. In the same equation, the terms within parenthesis 
represent the difference between growth of the working-age population and 
growth of the total population. This is the accounting effect. 
N
,yˆ
 Bloom et al. (2001) use growth of output per capita as the regressand  
in their growth regressions. However, the second equation in (1) reveals that 
growth of output per capita contains both, the behavioral and the accounting 
effect. Bloom et al. show that it is possible to test for a behavioral effect with 
growth of output per capita as the regressand . However, the assessment of a 
behavioral effect is rather complicated in this case and Kelley and Schmidt 
                                                 
6 Earlier work arguing in favour of a growth effect from changing age structure is Coale and 
Hoover (1958).  
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(2005) argue that in this case there are problems from high multicollinearity. In 
contrast, growth of output per working-age person is free of an accounting 
effect. For this reason, Kelley and Schmidt (2005) and Prskawetz et al. (2004) 
use growth of output per working-age person as the regressand in their 
growth regressions.7 Kögel (2005) uses for the same reason growth of output 
per worker as the regressand . However, this is probably not a good choice, 
as the labor force participation rate is highly endogenous and it is difficult to 
come about with appropriate instruments to account for its endogeneity. 
 Demographic variables are probably endogeneous in growth 
regressions. Bloom and Williamson (1998) and Bloom et al. (2001) apply two-
stage least squares regressions (2SLS) and instrument growth of the working-
age population and growth of the total population with lagged demographic 
variables. However, due to serial correlation, lagged demographic variables 
seem to be endogenous as well. Kelly and Schmidt (2005) and Prskawetz et 
al. (2004) regress growth of output per working-age person on the youth 
dependency ratio and control variables. The former study uses OLS, while the 
latter study uses geographical variables as instruments. Further, similar to 
Hall and Jones (1999), Prskawetz et al. (2004) control for social infrastructure 
and measure it with the average of (i) the indicator of rule of law in Kaufman 
et al. (2003) and (ii) a measure of openness to trade. Moreover, they 
instrument social infrastructure with further geographical variables. The 
authors find significant effects of the youth dependency ratio and of social 
infrastructure on economic growth. However, the indicator of rule of law is 
only available for the 1990s and is only a proxy for its average quality over a 
longer time frame. The present study improves the approach of Prskawetz et 
al. by using Polity IV’s constraint on the executive, which is available for 1960-
2000 and is the recently preferred measure for institutions of Acemoglu and 
Johnson (2005).  
 
3. THE EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 
The empirical analysis applies cross-country regressions to average 
values for 1960-2000. Following the work of Acemoglu and co-authors, the 
empirical analysis is based on former colonies, which allows the use of former 
colonies’ settler mortality rates in the early 19th century as an instrument for 
institutions. This approach follows the aforementioned argument of Acemoglu 
et al. (2001) that, in colonies with high settler mortality rates, Europeans set 
up extractive and therefore bad institutions, while, in colonies with low settler 
mortality, they settled and set up good institutions. For a few former colonies, 
data for output per working-age person in 1960 or 2000 or data for 
geographical variables as instruments for the youth dependency ratio are not 
available. This limits the number of countries in the sample to 55. (A list of all 
countries is shown in the appendix, together with descriptions and data 
sources of all variables used in this study).   
The paper’s empirical strategy is to use the following cross-country 
regression equation for the time interval [1960, 2000]: 
                                                 
7 If of interest, the additional accounting effect can directly be calculated from the difference 
between growth of the working-age population and growth of the total population (see 
Prskawetz et al., 2004).  
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where  represents the annual growth rate of output per working-
age person, denotes the natural logarithm of output per working-
age person in country i  in year 1960 and LNYOUTHDEP  is the natural 
logarithm of the youth dependency ratio. Further,  denotes constraint 
on the executive, Z  denotes one or more control variables and  is the error 
term. Eq. (2) contains because according to the conditional 
convergence hypothesis, which is in particular a feature of the neoclassical 
growth model, a country grows the faster the further its income level is below 
its steady state level. The coefficient of  is hence predicted to be 
negative and the other variables in eq. (2) are predicted to determine a 
country’s income level in the steady state. 
GROWTH
i,1960LNYWA
XCON
iε
i,1960LNYWA
i,1960LNYWA
 The youth dependency ratio is likely to be endogenous. Therefore, in 
the present study, it is instrumented with the following instruments: 
 
• KGPTEMP. Percentage of a country’s population in temperate zones, 
based on the Köppen-Geiger ecozone classification system (Gallup et al., 
1999, and Sachs, 2003). 
• KGPTR. Percentage of a country’s population in Köppen-Geiger tropical 
ecozones (Gallup et al., 1999).  
 
According to mainstream population economics, fertility is mainly driven by 
socioeconomic variables. However, socioeconomic variables are likely to be 
endogenous and hence are inappropriate as instruments. In addition, 
according to classical demographic transition theory, reductions in infant 
mortality cause a fertility decline during the demographic transition. However, 
as Bloom and Sachs (1998) show, despite of significant reductions in Africa’s 
infant mortality rate, Africa’s fertility rate remained very high, contrary to Asia 
and Latin America. Furthermore, Bloom and Sachs argue that, according to 
literature, part of Africa’s high fertility remains unexplained even after 
accounting for socioeconomic variables in addition to infant mortality. For this 
reason, further unknown determinants must have contributed to Africa’s 
persistently high fertility rate. In quest of exogenous proxies for all these 
determinants of fertility and therefore as instruments for the youth 
dependency ratio, the present paper uses the two abovementioned Köppen-
Geiger ecozones, which turn out to have quite a nice statistical fit. 
 The paper’s measure for institutions, , is also likely to be 
endogenous, as is argued in the aforementioned recent literature. In addition, 
measures of institutions contain measurement errors. For both reasons, this 
paper’s strategy is to instrument it with the following instruments:
XCON
 8
 
 
  
                                                 
8 I would like to thank Simon Johnson for providing the data for these instruments.  
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• LNMORT. Natural logarithm of settler mortality in the early 19th century. 
• LEGALENG. A dummy variable that takes on value of 1 if a country has a 
British legal origin (all countries in the paper’s sample have either British or 
French legal origin). 
 
The use of settler mortality as an instrument for institutions follows 
Acemoglu and co-authors, for the reasons explained before. The use of legal 
origin as an instrument follows La Porta et al. (1999), Beck et al. (2003) and 
Levine (2005). Using for  average values from 1990 to 2000, Acemoglu 
and Johnson (2005) find that  is insignificantly correlated with legal 
origin. However, it can be shown that this is only true for the 1990s. Before 
the 1990s,  was significantly correlated with legal origin and is 
therefore an appropriate instrument for the average value of  from 
1960 to 2000. 
XCON
XCON
XCON
XCON
 
4. THE BASIC RESULT 
 
Table 1 contains the results of the first-stage regressions for the youth 
dependency ratio and the paper’s measure for institutions. It is evident from 
the table that settler mortality, one of the instruments of institutions, is not only 
highly correlated with institutions, but also with the youth dependency ratio. 
This causes some identification problems and is, most likely, due to the fact 
that infant and child mortality affect the youth dependency ratio and both 
mortality rates are also correlated with settler mortality. However, it is also 
evident from Table 1 that last section’s first set of instruments (KGPTEMP and 
KGPTR) mainly affects the youth dependency ratio, while LEGALENG, from 
last section’s second set of instruments, mainly affects institutions. Therefore, 
an important feature of the aforementioned two sets of instruments is that all 
instruments, apart from settler mortality, have a nice separable form. If this 
were not the case, problems would arise from high multicollinearity between 
the fitted values of the youth dependency ratio and those of institutions, 
making identification impossible (see, Kraay and Dollar, 2003). That the two 
sets of instruments have to some extent a nice separable form is confirmed by 
the fact that, in each first stage regression, the Shea Partial R2 does not differ 
much from the Partial R2 (see the two bottom rows of Table 1). Both statistics 
 
TABLE 1 
First stage regression for LNYOUTHDEP & XCON, 1960-2000 
First-stage regression LNYOUTHDEP  XCON 
LNYWA in 1960 -0.07 (0.01) 0.87 (0.00) 
KGPTEMP -0.42 (0.00) -1.02 (0.17) 
KGPTR -0.10 (0.05) 0.25 (0.60) 
LNMORT 0.03 (0.03) -0.57 (0.00) 
LEGALENG -0.05 (0.16) 1.96 (0.00) 
Partial R2 0.51 0.55 
Shea Partial R2  0.47 0.51 
Notes: The p-values are in parentheses behind the values of the coefficients. The constant is 
omitted.  
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measure, for each first-stage regression, the correlation between the 
instruments and the instrumented variable. However, the degree to which the 
instruments take a nice separable form is only measured in the Shea Partial 
R2. If the value of the Shea Partial R2 dropped a lot in comparison to the 
Partial R2, then this would show that too many instruments are correlated with 
both instrumented variables and identification would be impossible.9
 Table 2 shows the second-stage regression results of the paper’s basic 
regression equation, which is last section’s equation (2), without any control 
variable  other than possibly dummy variables for world regions. The table 
contains results from two different estimators, namely, the more common 
2SLS and the Fuller estimator. In addition, the table shows results from Fuller 
estimations with dummy variables for Sub-Saharan Africa and the East Asian 
Pacific Region (which turned out to be the only significant regional 
dummies).
Z
10 Stock et al. (2002) and Hahn and Hausman (2003) suggest 
Fuller estimation in case of weak instruments (i.e. in case the instruments are 
only weakly correlated with the instrumented variables).11 In case instruments 
are correlated with more than one instrumented variable (as discussed 
above), a weak instrument problem might arise. 
A glance at Table 2 shows evidence for conditional convergence, as in 
all three regressions the coefficient of LNYWA in 1960 is significant and 
negative. More importantly, in all three regressions, the youth dependency 
ratio has a significant and negative effect on economic growth, while 
institutions have a significant and positive effect on economic growth (with a 
p-value of 0.09 for XCON in case of Fuller estimation with regional dummies). 
This shows that demography, as well as institutions, both matter for economic  
growth.  
The row above the bottom row of Table 2 shows the Cragg-Donald   
 
TABLE 2 
Explaining annual growth of output per working-age person, 1960-2000. 
Second-stage regression 2SLS Fuller Fuller 
LNYWA in 1960 -0.86 (0.00) -0.86 (0.00) -1.00 (0.00) 
LNYOUTHDEP -2.84 (0.02) -2.59 (0.05) -2.81 (0.00) 
XCON 0.30 (0.01) 0.34 (0.01) 0.16 (0.09) 
Sub-Saharan Africa   -0.99 (0.00) 
East Asian Pacific Region   1.21 (0.03) 
Cragg-Donald Statistic 
(critical value) 
10.58 
(11.04) 
10.58 
(8.53) 
11.90 
(8.53) 
Sargan Statistic (OIR) 0.09 0.09 0.56 
Notes: The p-values are in parentheses behind the values of the coefficients. The constant is 
omitted. The instruments are KGPTEMP, KGPTR, LNMORT and LEGALENG. 
                                                 
9 In Table 1, the first-stage regressions include also LNYWA in 1960. This is due to the fact 
that, in 2SLS, the first-stage regressions include all exogenous variables and these are, apart 
from the instruments that appear only in the first-stage regressions, also the exogenous 
variables that appear in the second-stage regression, i.e. in last section’s equation (2).   
10 Throughout the paper, results with 2SLS with regional dummies are similar to the results 
with Fuller estimation and are therefore not shown.  
11 Throughout the paper, as has been suggested in case of Fuller estimation, the user-
supplied Fuller parameter alpha is set equal to one. All estimations were done in STATA 
using the command “ivreg2”.  
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Statistics. This statistic shows whether or not the instruments are weak. In the 
table, below the Cragg-Donald Statistics in parenthesis are shown the five 
percent critical values compiled by Stock and Yogo (2005). A Cragg-Donald 
Statistic below this critical value implies that the instruments are weak at the 5 
percent significance level. In turn, weak instruments cause a distortion of the 
conventional significance test of the instrumented variables. Stock and Yogo 
show that this conventional significance test is severely distorted, if the Cragg-
Donald Statistic is below seven (cf. Carstensen and Gundlach, 2006).  In 
Table 2 the Cragg-Donald Statistic is always above seven. Furthermore, in 
case of Fuller estimation the Cragg-Donald Statistic is always above the 
critical value, while it is only slightly below the critical value, in case of 2SLS. 
Hence, in case of the basic regression, there is no weak instrument problem.  
The bottom row of Table 2 shows the Sargan Statistics. This statistic 
shows the p-value of the Sargan-Hausman test of overidentifying restrictions. 
A high p-value indicates that none of the instruments belongs into the second-
stage regression. In case of estimation without regional dummies, the Sargan 
Statistics show that some instruments might possibly belong into the second-
stage regression. However, the third regression estimation with regional 
dummies shows that in this case clearly none of the instruments belongs into 
the second-stage regression. 
 
5. ROBUSTNESS WITH RESPECT TO OTHER DEMOGRAPHIC OR DEMO-
GEOGRAPHICAL VARIABLES 
 
As mentioned in section 2, Bloom and Williamson (1998) and Bloom et al. 
(2001) included, in their growth regressions, growth of the total population and 
growth of the working age population as regressors and used growth of output 
per worker as their regressand. Further, Bloom et al. (2001) point out that 
coefficients of -1 and +1 for growth of the total population and growth of the 
working age population, respectively, implies a pure accounting effect from 
these variables. In contrast, if the absolute values of these coefficients exceed 
one, then these two variables also have behavioral effects. As discussed in 
section 2, the present study uses, in growth regressions, growth of output per 
working-age person as regressand because this measure of economic growth 
is free of the accounting effect. In case of growth of output per working-age 
person as regressand, significance of growth of the total population and 
growth of the working age population implies presence of behavioral effects 
from these variables. As Kelley and Schmidt (2005) and Prskawetz et al. 
(2004) argue, from the point of view of economic theory, it seems more 
reasonable to think of a behavioral effect from the level of the dependency 
ratio (the population below and above working age divided by the population 
of working age) than from growth of the dependency ratio. The reason for this 
is the fact that, according to economic theory, savings are only affected from 
the level of the dependency ratio and not its growth rate. Nevertheless, this 
paper follows the approach in Kelley and Schmidt (2005) and Prskawetz et al. 
(2004) to let the data speak and tests explicitly for a growth effect from growth 
of the dependency ratio. For this purpose, the variable DEPRATIOGROWTH 
has been calculated as the difference between growth of the total population 
and growth of the working-age population.              
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 Table 3 contains the result from adding DEPRATIOGROWTH as an 
instrumented control variable to the basic regression.12 As instrument for this 
control variable the paper uses a malaria ecology index, abbreviated ME, 
which turned out to be significant for DEPRATIOGROWTH. The malaria 
ecology index is taken from Kiszewski et al. (2004) and is, in the 
aforementioned literature supporting the geography hypothesis, used as an 
exogenous instrument for malaria prevalence. In the table, the first two 
regressions, which do not contain regional dummies, suggest a significant 
growth effect of growth of the dependency ratio. However, the third 
regression, which contains regional dummies, reveals that in this case growth 
of the dependency ratio is insignificant and therefore does not imply a 
behavioral effect. A glance at the bottom of the table, though, reveals a very 
low Cragg-Donald Statistic in all three regressions, implying that there is a 
weak instrument problem in these regressions.  
 
TABLE 3 
Explaining annual growth of output per working-age person, 1960-2000, 
controlling for DEPRATIOGROWTH as instrumented variable. 
Second-stage regression 2SLS Fuller Fuller 
LNYWA in 1960 -1.08 (0.00) -1.08 (0.00) -1.08 (0.00) 
LNYOUTHDEP -3.76 (0.00) -3.76 (0.00) -3.45 (0.01) 
XCON 0.05 (0.74) 0.05 (0.74) 0.09 (0.62) 
DEPRATIOGROWTH 2.45 (0.01) 2.45 (0.01) 1.26 (0.60) 
Sub-Saharan Africa   -0.57 (0.46) 
East Asian Pacific Region   0.95 (0.19) 
Cragg-Donald Statistic 
(critical value) 
2.56 
(9.53) 
2.56 
(NA) 
0.70 
(NA) 
Sargan Statistic (OIR) 0.56 0.56 0.33 
Notes: The p-values are in parentheses behind the values of the coefficients. The constant is 
omitted. The instruments are KGPTEMP, KGPTR, LNMORT, LEGALENG and ME. NA 
means non-available. 
 
The aforementioned literature supporting the geography hypothesis 
argues that there is a direct growth effect from malaria prevalence. Hence, it 
could be that, in the last section’s basic regression, the youth dependency 
ratio captured spuriously the growth effect from malaria prevalence. To check 
for this possibility, Table 4 contains the results from controlling malaria 
prevalence, MALFAL, as a further instrumented variable. Following the 
aforementioned literature, malaria prevalence is instrumented with the malaria 
ecology index, ME. Table 4 reveals an insignificant growth effect from malaria 
prevalence in all three regressions. In contrast, the youth dependency ratio 
remains in all cases significant. The Cragg-Donald Statistics at the bottom of 
the table seem to be below the critical values. However, in the regressions 
without regional dummies they are only slightly below seven. Hence, the 
instruments are weak, but they seem not to be very weak. Therefore, it seems 
                                                 
12 Use of this variable as control variable implies the same magnitude of the coefficient of 
growth of the total population and growth of the working-age population (with opposite sign). 
In principle, this does not have to be the case. However, it is difficult to find different 
instruments for both variables. In addition, population growth is highly correlated with the 
youth dependency ratio, giving rise to a multicollinearity problem.  
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TABLE 4 
Explaining annual growth of output per working-age person, 1960-2000, 
controlling for MALFAL as instrumented variable. 
Second-stage regression 2SLS Fuller Fuller 
LNYWA in 1960 -1.00 (0.00) -0.99 (0.00) -0.89 (0.00) 
LNYOUTHDEP -2.69 (0.02) -2.48 (0.04) -2.98 (0.00) 
XCON 0.24 (0.08) 0.28 (0.06) 0.19 (0.10) 
MALFAL -0.67 (0.25) -0.59 (0.34) 1.53 (0.30) 
Sub-Saharan Africa   -2.01 (0.06) 
East Asian Pacific Region   0.71 (0.33) 
Cragg-Donald Statistic 
(critical value) 
6.65 
(9.53) 
6.65 
(NA) 
2.02 
(NA) 
Sargan Statistic (OIR) 0.15 0.16 0.50 
Notes: The p-values are in parentheses behind the values of the coefficients. The constant is 
omitted. The instruments are KGPTEMP, KGPTR, LNMORT, LEGALENG and ME. NA 
means non-available. 
 
sensible to conclude that the significant growth effect of the youth 
dependency ratio is robust to controlling for malaria prevalence.13
  
6. ROBUSTNESS WITH RESPECT TO NON-DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES14
     
 Among others, Bloom and Sachs (1998) argued that other 
geographical variables than malaria prevalence could affect economic growth 
as well. Masters and McMillan (2001) show evidence for a growth effect of 
climate conditions. Indeed, climate conditions could affect economic growth 
indirectly though its effect on agricultural productivity. Gallup et al. (1999) 
point to a growth effect from high transport costs in Africa that hamper 
participation in the major world markets and could therefore negatively affect 
economic growth. For these reasons, it could be that, in the basic regression 
of section 3, the youth dependency ratio captured the growth effect from other 
geographical variables than malaria prevalence. 
 Table 5 shows the results from including PLFST5 as an exogenous 
control variable. PLFST5 measures the proportion of land with more than 5 
frost-day per month in winter and is the preferred measure for climate 
conditions of Masters and McMillan (2001). The table shows that there is 
clearly no significant growth effect from PLFST5, while, by and large, the 
youth dependency ratio remains significant. In addition, the Cragg-Donald 
Statistics reveal that there is not a serious weak instrument problem. 
 
    
                                                 
13 In defence of the literature supporting the geography hypothesis, it should be mentioned 
though, that, in the regressions of Table 4, MALFAL is the average of MALFAL in 1966 and 
1994. It is quite possible that MALFAL in 1966 contains measurement errors leading to a 
downwards bias of the coefficient of MALFAL. 
14 Levine and Renelt (1992) find the investment rate to be the most robust determinant of 
growth. However, investment rates are highly endogenous. Related, as Kelley and Schmidt 
(2005) argue, according to growth theory, significance of investment rate would suggest that 
the set of exogenous variables determining the steady state income level is incomplete. For 
these reasons, this section does not control for investment rates.  
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TABLE 5 
Explaining annual growth of output per working-age person, 1960-2000, 
controlling for PLFST5 as exogenous variable. 
Second-stage regression 2SLS Fuller Fuller 
LNYWA in 1960 -0.82 (0.00) -0.80 (0.00) -0.97 (0.00) 
LNYOUTHDEP -2.46 (0.08) -1.77 (0.28) -2.09 (0.07) 
XCON 0.28 (0.02) 0.35 (0.01) 0.17 (0.10) 
PLFST5 0.37 (0.51) 0.48 (0.42) 0.51 (0.26) 
Sub-Saharan Africa   -1.02 (0.00) 
East Asian Pacific Region   1.37 (0.01) 
Cragg-Donald Statistic 
(critical value) 
8.00 
(11.04) 
8.00 
(8.53) 
8.52 
(8.53) 
Sargan Statistic (OIR) 0.02 0.03 0.11 
Notes: The p-values are in parentheses behind the values of the coefficients. The constant is 
omitted. The instruments are KGPTEMP, KGPTR, LNMORT and LEGALENG. 
 
 In the regressions of Table 6 LANDLOCK is added as an exogenous 
control variable to the basic regression. LANDLOCK is a dummy variable that 
takes on value of 1 if a country is landlocked. The variable is supposed to 
capture a growth effect from high transport costs. A glance at Table 6 reveals 
that also LANDLOCKED is insignificant, while the youth dependency ratio 
remains quite robustly significant. The Cragg-Donald Statistics show absence  
of a weak instrument problem. 
 
TABLE 6 
Explaining annual growth of output per working-age person, 1960-2000, 
controlling for LANDLOCKED as exogenous variable. 
Second-stage regression 2SLS Fuller Fuller 
LNYWA in 1960 -0.80 (0.00) -0.79 (0.00) -0.97 (0.00) 
LNYOUTHDEP -2.43 (0.06) -2.22 (0.10) -2.64 (0.01) 
XCON 0.29 (0.02) 0.32 (0.01) 0.15 (0.12) 
LANDLOCKED -0.40 (0.32) -0.40 (0.34) -0.24 (0.44) 
Sub-Saharan Africa   -0.99 (0.00) 
East Asian Pacific Region   1.21 (0.02) 
Cragg-Donald Statistic 
(critical value) 
10.14 
(11.04) 
10.14 
(8.53) 
11.36 
(8.53) 
Sargan Statistic (OIR) 0.13 0.13 0.11 
Notes: The p-values are in parentheses behind the values of the coefficients. The constant is 
omitted. The instruments are KGPTEMP, KGPTR, LNMORT and LEGALENG. 
 
Finally, there could also be an effect from culture on economic growth 
(see, e.g., Weil, 2005, Ch. 14). Easterly and Levine (1997) argue that high 
ethnic fractionalization contributes to Africa’s low economic growth. Moreover, 
Grier (1997) and Barro and McCleary (2003) argue that religion affects 
economic growth. Again, omission of cultural variables could lead to a 
spuriously significant coefficient of the youth dependency ratio.  
Table 7 shows that there is a significant growth effect of ethnic 
fractionalization, ETHNICFRAC, in regressions that do not control for regional 
dummies. Nevertheless, the youth dependency remains significant with p-  
 12
 
TABLE 7 
Explaining annual growth of output per working-age person, 1960-2000, 
controlling for ETHNICFRAC as exogenous variable. 
Second-stage regression 2SLS Fuller Fuller 
LNYWA in 1960 -0.94 (0.00) -0.94 (0.00) -1.00 (0.00) 
LNYOUTHDEP -2.41 (0.05) -2.25 (0.07) -2.70 (0.00) 
XCON 0.32 (0.01) 0.34 (0.01) 0.18 (0.08) 
ETHNICFRAC -1.20 (0.05) -1.21 (0.05) -0.33 (0.59) 
Sub-Saharan Africa   -0.88 (0.01) 
East Asian Pacific Region   1.30 (0.02) 
Cragg-Donald Statistic 
(critical value) 
10.23 
(11.04) 
10.23 
(8.53) 
11.25 
(8.53) 
Sargan Statistic (OIR) 0.20 0.20 0.57 
Notes: The p-values are in parentheses behind the values of the coefficients. The constant is 
omitted. The instruments are KGPTEMP, KGPTR, LNMORT and LEGALENG. 
  
values of 0.05 and 0.07. The third regression shows that ethnic 
fractionalization becomes insignificant, once one controls for regional 
dummies. In contrast, the youth dependency ratio is highly significant in this 
regression. The Cragg-Donald Statistics reveal that, in the regressions of 
Table 7, there is no weak instrument problem. 
Table 8 includes, as exogenous control variables, dummy variables for 
the principle religion in a country. The table shows, for each of the three 
regressions, the p-value of a test of joint significance of these dummy 
variables. It is evident that religion is always clearly insignificant. In addition, 
the youth dependency ratio is always significant. As before, the Cragg-Donald 
Statistics show absence of major problems from weak instruments. 
 
TABLE 8 
Explaining annual growth of output per working-age person, 1960-2000, 
controlling for religion as exogenous variable. 
Second-stage regression 2SLS Fuller Fuller 
LNYWA in 1960 -1.06 (0.00) -1.07 (0.00) -1.07 (0.00) 
LNYOUTHDEP -3.22 (0.01) -3.01 (0.03) -3.05 (0.00) 
XCON 0.37 (0.00) 0.42 (0.00) 0.21 (0.08) 
P-value for religion (0.57) (0.55) (0.87) 
Sub-Saharan Africa   -0.87 (0.01) 
East Asian Pacific Region   1.32 (0.02) 
Cragg-Donald Statistic 
(critical value) 
9.60 
(11.04) 
9.60 
(8.53) 
8.16 
(8.53) 
Sargan Statistic (OIR) 0.09 0.10 0.57 
Notes: The p-values are in parentheses behind the values of the coefficients. The constant is 
omitted. The instruments are KGPTEMP, KGPTR, LNMORT and LEGALENG. 
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